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Abstract. In this work we present a prototype for simulating computer
network attacks. Our objective is to simulate large networks (thousands
of hosts, with applications and vulnerabilities) while remaining realistic
from the attacker’s point of view. The foundation for the simulator is a
model of computer intrusions, based on the analysis of real world attacks.
In particular we show how to interpret vulnerabilities and exploits as
communication channels. This conceptual model gives a tool to describe
the theater of operations, targets, actions and assets involved in multistep
network attacks. We conclude with applications of the attack simulator.
1 From Real World Attacks to an Attack Model
1.1 Introduction
In Section 1 we begin with a brief description of real world attacks, and de-
scribe an abstraction of the attack actions. Section 2 delves in mores detail in
the “Attack and Penetrate” phase of an attack, in which the attacker exploits a
vulnerability to gain access to a target machine. Again, we show how to abstract
and generalize the process of exploitation and payload execution. In Section 3 we
present the prototype for simulating network attacks, based on the implementa-
tion of multiplatform agents and the abstraction of vulnerabilities and exploits
as communication channels. Section 4 deals with the tension between realism
and performance in the simulation. Finally we mention some applications of the
simulator.
1.2 Computer Network Intrusions
During a network intrusion, an attacker tries to gain access to software sys-
tems that require authorization (for example, web servers, database servers or
accounting systems). The intrusion may be illegal (what people usually have
in mind when speaking about intrusions), or may be an authorized audit per-
formed by security professionals. The latter is called a network penetration test:
a proactive and authorized attempt to compromise network security and access
sensitive information by taking advantage of vulnerabilities. As networks evolve,
and combine a multitude of interconnected technologies, the penetration test
has become an accepted practice to evaluate the global security of a network
(ultimately assessing effectiveness of the deployed security countermeasures).
The interesting point for us is that pentesters basically use the same tools and
methodologies as unauthorized attackers, so we can focus on the former (whose
practices are also more documented!)
1.3 Main Steps of an Attack
Information Gathering. A successful attack depends on the ability to gather
relevant information about the target network, including active Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses, operating systems and available services. Actions realized during
this phase include:
– Network discovery: performed utilizing mechanisms including ARP, TCP
SYN packets, ICMP echo request, TCP connect and passive discovery.
– Port scanning: an exhaustive scan of open and closed ports of all the network
hosts.
– OS identification: consists in recognizing the OS of a remote host by analyz-
ing its responses to a set of tests. Classical Nmap’s fingerprinting database
can be combined with a neural network to accurately match OS responses to
signatures, see [5]. Additional OS identification capabilities are available for
more specific situations. For instance, OS detection utilizing the DCE-RPC
and SMB protocols can identify Windows machines more precisely.
– Other techniques available to human attackers are social engineering and
Google hacking (using publicly available information to gain insight on the
target organization).
Attack and Penetrate. During this phase, the attacker selects and launches
remote exploits making use of data obtained in the Information Gathering step.
An exploit is a piece of software that injects code in the vulnerable system’s
memory and modifies the execution flow to make the system run the exploit
code. As we will see in section 2, the exploit can be thought of as a way to
install an agent on a compromised host.
Local Information Gathering. The Local Information Gathering step col-
lects information about computers that the attacker has successfully compro-
mised. During this phase, the attacker may gather information about the OS,
network configuration, users and installed applications; browse the filesystem
on compromised systems; view rights obtained and interact with compromised
systems via shells.
Privilege Escalation. During the Privilege Escalation phase, the attacker at-
tempts to penetrate deeper into a compromised computer by running local ex-
ploits in an attempt to obtain administrative privileges (to gain root or superuser
privileges).
Pivoting. After Privilege Escalation, the attacker can use the newly controlled
host as a vantage point from which to run attacks deeper into the network. By
sending instructions to an installed agent, the attacker can run local exploits to
attack systems internally, rather than from across the network. He can view the
networks to which a compromised computer is connected, and launch attacks
from any compromised system to other computers on the same network, gaining
access to systems with increasing levels of security. That is, the attacker executes
the previous steps (Information Gathering and Attacking) using the new agent
as a source.
Clean Up. The attackers needs to clean up his steps to avoid detection. To-
wards this end, all the executed actions should minimize the noise produced, for
example, by making modifications only in memory and by not writing files in
the target’s filesystem.
1.4 Abstraction of Attack Actions
After this brief review of the steps of a real world attack, we present here the
model that we use as abstraction of an attack. The conceptual building blocks
are Assets, Actions and Agents.
Assets. An asset can represent anything that an attacker may need to obtain
during the course of an attack. More precisely, it represents the knowledge that
an attacker has of a real object or property of the network. Examples of assets
are:
* BannerAsset (banner, host, port)
* OperatingSystemAsset (os, host)
* IPConnectivityAsset (source, target)
* TCPConnectivityAsset (source, target, port)
A BannerAsset represents the banner that an attacker obtains when trying to
connect to a certain port on a host. An OperatingSystemAsset represents the
knowledge that an attacker has about the operating system of a host. An IP-
ConnectivityAsset represents the fact that an attacker is able to establish an IP
connection between a source host and a target host (given by their IP addresses).
A TCPConnectivityAsset represents the fact that an attacker is able to establish
a TCP connection between a source host and a fixed port of a target host
(given by port number and IP address).
The assets we consider are probabilistic. This allows us to represent prop-
erties which we guess are true with a certain probability or negative proper-
ties (which we know to be false). For example, an action which determines the
OS of a host using banners (OSDetectByBannerGrabber) may give as result
an OperatingSystemAsset os=linux with probability=0.8 and a second one
with os=openbsd and probability=0.2. Another example, an ApplicationAs-
set host=192.168.13.1 and application=#Apachewith probability=0means
that our agent has determined that this host is not running Apache.
Attack Actions. These are the basic steps which form an attack. Examples
of actions include, but are not limited to: Apache Chunked Encoding Exploit,
WuFTP globbing Exploit (subclasses of Exploit), Banner Graber, OS Detect by
Banner, OS Fingerprint, Network Discovery, IP Connect and TCP Connect. We
review below the principal attributes of an action.
Action goal. An action has a goal and when executed successfully the action
completes the asset associated with its goal. This is also called the action result.
Usually, an action is directed against a target, where the target is a computer
or a network. But there are different types of goals like gathering information
or establishing connectivity between two agents or hosts, where the notion of
target is not so clear. Thus the concept of goal is more general and allows us to
speak about intermediate steps of an attack.
It is also common to speak about the result of an action (for example to
increase access, obtain information, corrupt information, gain use of resources,
denial of service), focusing on non authorized results. This is a particular case
of our concept of goal. Note that when an action completes the goal asset, we
are taking into account only the expected result of the action. Undesired results
and other side effects fall into the category of noise.
Action requirements. The requirements are assets that will be the goals of
other attack actions, which must have been successfully executed before the
considered action can be run. The requirements are the equivalent of children
nodes in [15] and subgoals in [17] and [13]. An abstract action must know what
kind of assets it may satisfy and which goals it requires before running. These
relations can be used to construct an attack graph. By analyzing of the attack
graph, the attacker can build a plan (as a sequence of actions) to reach the final
objective. On the use of attack graphs for automated planning, we refer the
reader to [9].
Environment conditions. The environment conditions refer to system con-
figuration or environment properties which may be necessary or may facilitate
the execution of the action. We distinguish the environment conditions from the
requirements, because the requirements express relations between actions (which
must be taken into account when planning a sequence of actions) whereas the
environment conditions refer to the “state of the world” (as far as the attacker
is aware of it) before the execution of the module, and do not imply previous
actions. For example, an exploit of a buffer overflow that runs only on specific
versions of an operating system, will have as requirement: “obtain information
about operating system version” and as environment condition “OS=RedHat
Linux; version between 6.1 and 6.9”. These conditions are not necessary, as the
action can be run anyway, but will dramatically increase its probability of suc-
cess.
Noise produced and stealthiness. The execution of the action will produce
noise. This noise can be network traffic, log lines in Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS), etc. Given a list as complete as possible of network sensors, we quantify
the noise produced respective to each of these sensors. The knowledge of the
network configuration and which sensors are likely to be active, allows us to
calculate a global estimate of the noise produced by the action.
With respect to every network sensor, the noise produced can be classified
into three categories: irremovable noise, noise that can be cleaned if the ac-
tion is successful (or another subsequent action is successful), noise that can be
cleaned even in case of failure. So we can also estimate the noise remaining after
cleanup. Of course, the stealthiness of an action will refer to the low level of noise
produced.
Running time and probability of success. The expected running time and
probability of success depends on the nature of the action, but also on the environ-
ment conditions, so their values are updated every time the attacker receives new
information about the environment. These values are necessary to take decisions
and choose a path in the graph of possible actions. Because of the uncertainties
on the execution environment, we consider three values for the running time:
minimum, average and maximum running time. Together with the stealthiness
and zero-dayness, these values constitute the cost of the action and are used to
evaluate sequences of actions.
2 On Vulnerabilities and Exploits
2.1 Anatomy of an Exploit
The exploits are the most important actions during an attack. An exploit is a
piece of code that attempts to compromise a workstation or desktop via a specific
vulnerability. According to the literal meaning of exploit, it takes advantage and
makes use of a hidden functionality. When used for actual network attacks,
exploits execute payloads of code that can alter, destroy or expose information
assets. When examining an exploit, three main components can be distinguished
(see [2] for more information).
Attack Vector. The attack vector is the mechanism the exploit uses to make a
vulnerability manifest, in other words, how to reach and trigger the bug. For ex-
ample, in the case of Apache Chunked Encoding Exploit, the attack vector is the
TCP connectivity that must be established on port 80 to reach the application.
Exploited Vulnerability. To obtain an unauthorized result, the exploit makes
use of a vulnerability. This can be a network configuration vulnerability, or a
software vulnerability: a design flaw or an implementation flaw (buffer overflow,
format string, race condition).
The most classic example is the buffer overflow, first described in “Smashing
the stack for fun and profit” by Aleph One (1996). The questions for the attacker
are: how to insert code and how to modify the execution flow to execute it? In
the example of a stack based buffer overflow, the code is inserted in a stack buffer
and by overflowing the buffer, the attacker can overwrite the return address and
jump to his code.
Payload. Once he manages to trigger and exploit a bug, the attacker gains
control of the vulnerable program. The payload is the functional component of
the exploit, the code the attacker is interested in running. Classical payloads
allow attackers to:
– Add a user account: on Unix systems, it was done by adding a line to the
system password file (/etc/password) or changing the password of root.
However such changes are easily detected (Tripwire can detect them) and
to use the account the attacker needs connectivity through legitimate paths
(firewalls can block them). This classical payload is no longer used.
– Changes to system configuration: for example, to append a line to the Inter-
net services daemon (inetd3) configuration file on Unix systems (/etc/inetd.conf)
in order to open a port on the compromised system, and later connect to
the system via the newly opened port.
– Shellcode: this is the most popular and has become almost synonymous for
“exploit payload”. It comprises opening a shell (a command interpreter),
that the attacker can use to execute available commands. These payloads
are more difficult to detect, but are also more difficult to write. See the
article of Aleph One [1] for a recount on this technique.
– Network aware shellcode. If the shell is opened on a remote machine, the
attacker has to find a way to communicate with the shell. A first solution
is the bind shellcode or bindshell, which listens for incoming connections on
a specified network port and protocol (usually TCP). The problem is that
firewalls or other filtering devices may block this connection. A second op-
tion is the reverse shell, that initiates the connection from the compromised
system. The third option is the reuse socket shellcode, that reuses the con-
nection method used to trigger and spawn the shell, thus making use of a
communication channel that the attacker knows to work.
Writing payloads is a very difficult task, that requires solving multiple con-
straints simultaneously. The payload is a sequence of byte codes, so each payload
will only work in a specific operating system and platform. Depending on the
attack vector, the payload may be sent to the vulnerable machine as an ASCII
(American Standard Code for Information Interchange) string (or some proto-
col field), and thus must respect a particular grammar (for example: byte 0 is
forbidden, only 7-bit ASCII is accepted, only alphanumeric characters are ac-
cepted, etc.) Libraries have been developed to help exploit writers to generate
3 For more information on inetd, refer to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inetd
shellcodes. The open source libraries “MOSDEF”4 and “InlineEgg”5 are two
well known cases, with tools to cope with the restrictions. The payload is also
typically limited in size (for example the buffer size in the case of a buffer over-
flow), so the code that the attacker will run must fit in a few hundred bytes. If
he wants to execute more complex applications, he must find another way.
2.2 Universal Payload
We present here the solution called “syscall proxy” (developed by Max Caceres
and others, see [6] for more details). The idea is to build a sort of “Universal
Payload” that allows an attacker to execute any system call on the vulnerable
host. By installing a small payload (a thin syscall server), the attacker will be
able to execute on his local host complex applications (a fat client), with all
system calls executed remotely.
Reminder on syscalls. A software process usually interacts with certain re-
sources: a file in disk, the screen, a networking card, a printer, etc. Processes can
access these resources through system calls (syscalls for short). These syscalls
are operating system services, usually identified with the lowest layer of commu-
nication between a user mode process and the Operating System (OS) kernel.
Different operating systems implement syscall services differently, sometimes
depending on the processor’s architecture. Examples of main groups include
UNIX and Windows.
UNIX systems use a generic and homogeneous mechanism for calling system
services, usually in the form of a “software interrupt”. Syscalls are classified by
number and arguments are passed either through the stack, registers or a mix of
both. The number of system services is usually kept to a minimum (about 270
syscalls can be seen in OpenBSD 2.9), as more complex functionality is provided
on higher user-level functions in the libc library. Usually there’s a direct mapping
between syscalls and the related libc functions.
In Windows the equivalent functionality is part of large user mode dynamic
libraries. We’ll refer to “Windows syscalls” to any function in any dynamic li-
brary available to a user mode process. For the sake of simplicity, this definition
includes higher level functions than those defined in ntdll.dll, and sometimes
very far above the user / kernel limit.
Syscall proxy. The resources that a process has access to, and the kind of access
it has on them, defines the “context” on which it is executed. For example, a
process that reads data from a file might do so using the open, read and close
syscalls.
4 The MOSDEF (a short for “Most Definitely”) library is available at
http://www.immunitysec.com/resources-freesoftware.shtml
5 The InlineEgg library is available at
http://oss.coresecurity.com/projects/inlineegg.html
Syscall proxying inserts two additional layers between the process and the
underlying operating system. These layers are the syscall client layer and the
syscall server layer. The syscall client layer acts as a link between the running
process and the underlying system services. This layer is responsible for for-
warding each syscall argument and generating a proper request that the syscall
server can understand. It is also responsible for sending this request to the syscall
server, usually through the Internet, and returning back the results to the call-
ing process. The syscall server layer receives requests from the syscall client to
execute specific syscalls using the underlying operating system services. This
layer marshals back the syscall arguments from the request in a way that the
underlying OS (Operating System) can understand and calls the specific service.
After the syscall finishes, its results are marshaled and sent back to the client,
again through the Internet.
There are multiple connection methods between agents. The originating agent
can use: connect to target (similar to bindshell), connect from target (similar to
reverse shell), reuse connection and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) tun-
neling. Agents can also be chained together to reach network resources with
limited connectivity.
Fig. 1. Diagram of a Proxy Call Execution
2.3 Attack Agents
In our attack model, the abstraction of arbitrary syscall servers is the concept
of Agents. The Agents are responsible for executing the attack actions. Thus an
attack typically begins with a local agent (representing the attacker, which can
interact with the local agent through a graphical console), and follows with the
main steps of an attack (as described in 1.3), where the successful exploitation
of a vulnerability means installing an agent.
The attacker is modeled as a set of connected agents, and exploits are modeled
as probabilistic actions that depend on the details of target OS and applications.
A software agent can take several forms, examples of which include: scripts,
toolkits or other kinds of programs. The autonomous agents who are able to take
decisions and continue the attack without human intervention, are of particular
interest. Such autonomous agents require planning abilities, see [9]
Agent mission. We contemplate different types of organizations between the
agents. One scenario is given by a “root agent” who plans the attack and then
gives the other agents orders (of executing actions), eventually creating new
agents if necessary, and asks the agents for feedback about action results in
order to decide further steps.
Another scenario is when the root agent delegates responsibilities to the other
agents, giving them higher level missions. To fulfill the mission, the agent will
have to do his own planning and communicate with other agents. This scenario is
likely to arise when stealthiness is a priority: communications are very expensive
and it becomes necessary to rely on the agents to execute their missions without
giving feedback (or the smallest amount of feedback, or delayed feedback because
of intermittent communication channels).
The environment knowledge. The environment knowledge (or simply en-
vironment) is a collection of information about the computer network being
attacked. Naturally, this information is represented by assets. In the beginning,
the environment contains only the local agent which will initiate the attack.
The environment plays an important role during the planning phase and
during the execution phase of an attack, since it continuously feedbacks the
behavior of the agent. The execution of an attack action (as defined in section
1.4) makes use of the knowledge that the executing agent has of the environment.
When the action is called, it begins by looking for an asset that completes its
goal in the environment. If this is the case, the information of the existing asset
is used to fulfill the goal, and the action returns a success signal, resulting in
zero cost (in terms of time, noise, success probability and stealthiness).
Note that two interesting graphs can be extracted from the environment
knowledge: the network topology graph and the agent distribution graph, whose
nodes are the agents involved in the attack and whose edges are the communi-
cation channels between agents.
3 Large Network Simulator
3.1 Focus on the attacker’s point of view
We now present our implementation of a network simulator specifically designed
to simulate network attacks. Our objective is to simulate very large networks,
for example 2.000 machines simulated on a single desktop PC. It is of course not
feasible to simulate all the network traffic, or to use a VMware server running
simultaneously 2.000 images.
The idea of our implementation is to focus on the point of view of the at-
tacker. Using our model of the attacker, we can build a simulator which is realistic
from his point of view. In particular, the simulator only generates information as
requested by the attacker. By performing this lazy evaluation, the main perfor-
mance bottleneck comes from the ability of the attacker to request information
from the network.
3.2 What scenarios can be simulated?
The simulated scenarios are composed of machines, networking devices and vul-
nerabilities. Supported machine components include, but are not limited to:
Windows workstations and servers, many Unix systems, routers, proxies, fire-
walls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Each machine can be indepen-
dently configured, and installed to run different software services, such as, but
not limited to: Web server, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server, Telnet and Se-
cure Shell. New applications can be developed for the simulator platform using
the usual development tools.
Network components are used to interconnect machines, and can simulate
hubs, switches, vlans and dialup connections and their security characteristics.
Vulnerability descriptions are entered in the vulnerabilities database, to allow the
simulation of the vulnerable application behavior. (There is no need to modify
the actual application’s code to reflect a vulnerability, nor to write any exploit
code). Aspects and types of vulnerabilities simulated include, but are not limited
to: local / remote, denial of service / exploit / leakage, probabilistic / dependent
on hidden parameters and noise level.
3.3 Multiplatform Agents
According to our attack model, an attacker can be effectively modeled by a
set of agents. Thus by simulating the behavior of the agents, we can simulate
the behavior of the network (this is transparent for the attacker). The whole
environment is accessed by the attacker through the local agent, and interactions
take place in the form of proxied system calls.
The base of the simulator are agents that respond to proxycalls. The agents
implement a syscall server for a specific operating system and platform, but all
of them have the same interface: this is what we call “Multiplatform Syscall”. So,
if an attacker (client) can install a multiplatform syscall agent in a victim host,
he does not care about the syscalls supported by the target host, the attacker
merely needs to know the universal syscall interface exported by the agent.
3.4 The Semantics of the Exploit Database
Security Model. In the simulator security model, a vulnerability is a mecha-
nism used to (potentially) access an otherwise restricted communication chan-
nel. An exploit is a “magic” string that opens access to some vulnerable agent’s
channel. It can be simulated as a message with a symbolic identifier, sent to an
application. Depending on the environment conditions, the exploit database will
determine the resulting behavior of the application.
Given a target machine M , the simulator iterates the list-like structure of
results in order. Each result entry has conditions associated to it, so the simu-
lator iterates the tree-like structure of requirements section and, if a match is
found, the action (install an agent, crash or reset) is executed with probabilistic
behavior. The execution of actions stops when an action is evaluated to True.
Requirements. In the requirements section, you can use several kind of tags.
The tags specify the conditions that have influence on the execution of the exploit
(that is on the result probabilities). Example:
<requirement type="system" id="req0">
<os arch="i386" name="windows" />
<win>nt4</win>
<edition>server enterprise_server</edition>
<servicepack>6 6a</servicepack>
</requirement>
This states that one of the possibilities is that the target machine runs Windows
version NT4, the edition should be “server” or “enterprise server” and the service
pack should be 6 or 6a. The requirements have a unique id to identify them, in
this case “req0”. Another requirement concerns the target application:
<requirement type="application" id="req1">
<status>target</status>
<name>Internet Information Services</name>
<version major="4 5" />
</requirement>
This states that the machine should be running Internet Information Services
(IIS), version major 4 or 5, and this application is the target of the exploit.
The possible status are:
1. target : the application is the target of the exploit (the most common case).
2. running: the application should be running but is not necessarily the target
of the attack.
3. installed : the application should be installed but not necessarily running.
4. not running: for example, a remote exploit will have more success probability
if the target machine is in a network with no firewalls running.
Requirements can be combined, for example:
<requirement type="compose" id="req2">
<operator>logic_and</operator>
<operands>req0 req1</operands>
</requirement>
The result of the “logic and” operation is a requirement stating that the target
machine should be running Windows NT4 server edition or enterprise server edi-
tion, and running IIS (Internet Information Services). There is also a “logic or”.
Results. The result is a list of the relevant probabilities, for example:
<result for="req1">
<crash chance="0.00" what="os" />
<reset chance="0.00" what="os" />
<crash chance="0.10" what="application" />
<reset chance="0.00" what="application" />
<agent chance="0.75" />
</result>
In order, these are: the chance of crashing the machine, of resetting the
machine (reboot), of crashing the target application (IIS), of resetting the target
application, and of successfully installing an agent.
To determine the result, we follow this procedure: processing the lines in
order; and for each positive probability, choose a random value between 0 and
1. If the value is smaller than the chance attribute, the corresponding action is
the result of the exploit.
In this example, we draw a random number to see if the application crashes.
If the value is smaller that 0.10, the application Internet Information Services
(IIS) is crashed and the execution of the exploit is finished. Otherwise, we draw
a second number to see if an agent is installed. If the value is smaller than 0.75,
the agent is installed, otherwise there is no visible result.
Other possible results (to be implemented) are:
1. Raise an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alarm.
2. Write some log in a network actor (like a firewall, IDS, router, etc).
3. Capture a session id, cookie, credential or password.
4 Performance Issues
4.1 Simulation versus emulation
From a systemic view-point, we speak of simulation when the level of detail of
interaction between components inside the system is mimicked, and emulation
when only the interaction of the system with the environment is mimicked.
These definitions depend on the level of abstraction, on a level of abstraction we
can describe the behavior of the system as a black-box or we can describe the
behavior of the components individually.
Following this line of thought, the system implemented simulates networks
in the socket abstraction level, and inside the network the behavior of machines
is emulated from the communication angle. The emulation of computers is basic
but complete, in the sense that a remote virtual user connecting to one of them
can execute different processes and handle data files.
4.2 Tension between realism and performance
There is a tension between realism and performance in the simulation. In this
case, good performance is achieved by only simulating the syscalls / socket ab-
straction level. Most actions work at the syscall level and attack upper levels of
abstraction, whereas the network packet switching is not simulated.
The network simulator was designed to be able to simulate networks of thou-
sands of computers. Each simulated machine has at least one thread. The goal
was to have a simulator on a single desktop computer with a simulated traffic
realistic from a penetration test point of view. It was not designed to simu-
late Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks as floods or worms but there
is a possibility in that direction also, maybe in dedicated servers running the
simulation.
4.3 Socket direct
A hierarchy for file descriptors was developed, including a variety of sockets
optimized for the simulation in one computer, called “socketdirect”. Socket direct
is fast: as soon as a connection is established, the client keeps a filedescriptor
pointing directly to the server’s descriptor. Routing is only executed during
the connection. Process Control Blocks (PCB) are created as expected, but are
only used during connection establishment. There is support for Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) sockets, and a
central set of systems calls, including filesystem syscalls, to emulate memory in
each machine of the network. Data enters to the simulation through the socket
subclass “socketreal”, which wraps a real BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution)
socket of the underlying operating system.
4.4 Scheduler
The responsibility of the scheduler is to assign the Central Processing Unit
(CPU) resources to the different machines in the simulation and inside each
machine to the different processes. The scheduling is non preemptive and round-
robin. The scheduling iterates over the hierarchy machine / process / thread as a
tree (like a depth-first search). Each machine has the possibility to run in round-
robin, where running means that the machine runs its processes in round-robin.
The same way running a process is giving all its threads the order to run until
a syscall is needed, if possible. Obviously depending on the state of each thread,
they run, change state or finish execution. The central issue is that threads ex-
ecute systems calls and then if possible continue their activity until they finish
or another system call is required.
Simulated threads are real threads of the OS (Operating System), simulated
machines and processes are all running within the unique process of the simula-
tor. Thanks to this architecture, there is no loss of performance due to context
switching (descriptors and pointers remain valid when switching from one ma-
chine to the other).
Fig. 2. Simulated TCP Port Scanning (time versus syscalls/second)
Something to remark is that the simulator doesn’t have to use all the CPU
when idle, so the scheduler was devised to sleep (e.g., 20ms) the simulator after
executing a constant number (e.g., 512) of machine runs (runs to sleep). This
leaves space for other programs interacting with the simulator to continue their
normal activity in the desktop machine while the simulator is idle.
Another improvement was to change the runs to sleep dynamically in a ex-
ponential increment and linear back-off fashion, depending on a threshold of
syscalls lost per sleep. This results in better overall response when there is sim-
ulated activity and less use of the CPU when there is no simulation activity.
Figures 2 and 3 show measurements that were done on a Pentium D 2.66Ghz
machine with 1.5GB of RAM, running Windows XP SP2. The simulated scenario
includes 100 networks of 10 machines each, so there are 1.000 machines running
in the simulation. When responding to a TCP Port Scan or an OS Detection by
Banner Grabber, the simulator answers between 700 and 900 syscalls per second.
Total running time of the modules (on a single network) lies between 100 and
120 seconds.
4.5 File system with templates
In order to handle thousand of files, avoiding wasting of huge disk space, the
filesystem simulation is accomplished mounting template filesystems. A template
filesystem is a common file repository shared by a group of virtual machines. For
Fig. 3. Simulated OS Detection by Banner Grabber (time versus syscalls/second)
example, all Windows systems share a common Windows file repository with the
default installation provided by Microsoft. These templates have read permission
only, so when a machine needs to read or change a file, the file is copied to a local
filesystem in that machine, this technique is well know as “copy on write”. The
fundamental idea is that if multiple callers ask for resources that are initially
indistinguishable, you can give them pointers to the same resource. This function
can be maintained until a caller tries to modify its copy of the resource, at which
point a true private copy is created to prevent the changes from becoming visible
to everyone else. All of this happens transparently to the callers. The primary
advantage is that if a caller never makes any modification, no private copy needs
to be created.
In order to improve the performance, a file cache was implemented: the sim-
ulator saves the most recent accessed files (or block of files) in memory. In high
scale simulated scenarios, it is very common to have several machines doing the
same task at (almost) the same time. For example, when the system starts up,
all UNIX machines read the boot script from /etc/initd file; if these kinds of
files are in the system cache, the booting process is faster, because only few disk
accesses are needed, even in scenarios of hundreds or thousands of simulated
machines.
5 Conclusion
We presented a network simulator focused on the attacker’s point of view. The
simulation is based on a model of network attacks, whose building blocks are
Assets, Actions and Agents. By making use of the proxy syscalls technology,
and simulating multiplatform agents, we were able to implement a simulation
that is both realistic and light-weight, allowing the simulation of networks with
thousands of hosts. Some applications of the simulator are:
– Cyber attack modeling and analysis tool. The different security components
can be configured to report attack evidence in the same way as the real
world components, allowing, for example, post-attack forensics analysis and
real-time detection exercises.
– Pentest training tool. A step by step tutorial for pentesters is hard to write
because the user might not have a proper target network setting, or because
the characteristics of the user’s target network are unknown. The simulator
can be used to deploy several complex scenarios in the user’s computer, so
that the user can follow the training on a shared scenario.
– Evaluation of countermeasures. Consider a system administrator that has
a set of measures which make certain attack actions less effective (in our
framework, a measure may reduce the probability of success of an attack
action, or increase the noise it produces, for example by adding a new IDS).
He can then use the simulation to see if his system becomes safe after all the
measures are deployed, or to find a minimal set of measures that make his
system safe.
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